Temporary Interstate Transactional Practice in the United States and Europe – Keeping Up with Modern Commercial Realities by Turina, Alessandro
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 9
12-1-2005
Temporary Interstate Transactional Practice in the
United States and Europe – Keeping Up with
Modern Commercial Realities
Alessandro Turina
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alessandro Turina, Temporary Interstate Transactional Practice in the United States and Europe –
Keeping Up with Modern Commercial Realities , 28 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 225 (2005),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol28/iss1/9
TEMPORARY INTERSTATE 
TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE IN  
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE—
KEEPING UP WITH MODERN 
COMMERCIAL REALITIES 
Alessandro Turina*
Abstract: The globalization of the ªnancial markets and technological 
innovation have contributed to a broad geographical expansion of 
corporations’ areas of interest. Providers of legal services seek to break 
through established local barriers to practice law in order to better cater 
to their clients’ needs. The European Union has been increasingly 
liberalizing interstate transactional practice of law within its member 
States. In the United States, on the other hand, there is a lack of 
jurisprudence permitting such practice. This Note examines the limits 
imposed by past decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of 
interstate transactional practice and argues in favor of a more liberal 
approach, through an expansive application of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause doctrine. 
Introduction 
 Globalization of the ªnancial markets and the increasing 
enlargement of multi-national corporations’ areas of interest have 
created the need for legal services to break through traditionally es-
tablished local barriers to practice.1 The United States’ economy and 
business, under major advancements in technology, is becoming in-
creasingly global in nature.2 Law ªrms, in order to remain competi-
tive and cater to their clients’ needs, must be able to operate in areas 
frequently far away from their headquarters.3 The tension between 
law ªrms’ need to break through local barriers to practice and the 
                                                                                                                      
* Alessandro Turina is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 See Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the U.S. Legal Profes-
sion, 25 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 1039, 1039–40 (2002). 
2 See Christine R. Davis, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in 
Today’s Legal Profession, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1339, 1341 (2002). 
3 See Silver, supra note 1, at 1039. 
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established legal limitations stiºing this process resulted in the liber-
alization, within the last twenty-ªve years, of the rules governing inter-
state legal practice in the European Union (EU).4
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ), through its jurisprudence, 
liberally interpreted the provisions of Articles 49 and 50 of the Euro-
pean Community Treaty (EC Treaty) and permitted lawyers to carry 
out interstate transactional practice with few limitations.5 On the 
other hand, in the United States, there is a lack of jurisprudence 
permitting such practice.6 Although the Supreme Court ruled that 
lawyers may invoke the protection of Article 4’s Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause in cross-state practice, these decisions involved the rights 
of nonresident lawyers to be admitted to a particular state bar.7 The 
Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause would grant nonresident lawyers the right to pro-
vide temporary interstate transactional services in states where they 
are not admitted to the bar.8
 The liberalization of interstate legal practice is an important goal 
to be accomplished if the legal profession wants to keep up with the 
globalization of the world economy.9 Countries around the world are 
already attempting to coordinate a common strategy to deal with a fu-
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in The European 
Union: Lessons for The United States, 34 Int’l Law. 307, 307–08 (2000). The European Union 
is an advanced form of multisectoral integration, its competence extending to the econ-
omy, industry, politics, citizens’ rights, and foreign policy of its Member States. See id. at 
307 n.2. The European Union was created by the Treaty on European Union, often re-
ferred to as the Treaty of Maastricht after the city in which it was signed on February 7, 
1992. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1. 
5 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 339. The European Community is at the core of the 
European Union and its original name was the European Economic Community when it 
was created by the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957. See id. at 307 n.2. The Treaty of Am-
sterdam signiªcantly amended the EC Treaty, the EU Treaty and certain other documents, 
resulting in the renumbering of the articles as of May 1, 1999. See Goebel, supra note 4, at 
307 n.2, citing Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 
O.J. (C 340) 1. Most recently the Treaty of Nice, signed at Nice on February 26, 2001, 
amended the EC Treaty, the EU Treaty and certain other documents. Treaty of Nice, Feb. 
6, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. Reference to the numbering will be made with respect to the 
most recent consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 
2002 O.J. (C 325) 1 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
6 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 340. 
7 See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 549 (1989); Supreme Court of Virginia v. 
Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 61 (1988); Supreme Court of New Hamsphire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 
274, 275 (1985). 
8 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 322. 
9 See Davis, supra note 2, at 1340-41. 
2005] Interstate Transactional Practice in the U.S. & Europe 227 
ture internationalization of the legal profession.10 For example, the 
General Trade Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) is one of a 
number of agreements that were reached in conjunction with the crea-
tion of the World Trade Organization in 1994.11 Legal services are 
among the trade issues covered by the GATS, and the agreement calls 
for member nations, including the United States, to develop rules that 
will make it possible for lawyers from one country to practice in other 
countries.12 Maybe it is time for the Supreme Court to adopt a more 
liberal jurisprudence along the lines of that adopted by the ECJ and 
reexamine the application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to 
transactional interstate practice.13
 Part I of this Note describes to what extent the Supreme Court ex-
pressly applied the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
to interstate legal practice. The Note then addresses the lack of a set-
tled jurisprudence dealing with cross-border transactional services by 
nonresident lawyers in jurisdictions where they are not licensed. The 
Note then brieºy addresses three cases demonstrating the sanctions 
faced by lawyers engaged in transactional practice in states where they 
have not been admitted to the bar. Part II presents the status of the law 
addressing interstate transactional practice in the EU, highlighting the 
relevant provisions of the EC Treaty, as interpreted by the ECJ in its 
most important landmark cases. Part III argues that, in the interest of 
harmony among the legal systems, as demanded by the increasing 
globalization of the world’s leading economies, the Supreme Court 
should reexamine the limits imposed by past decisions in the area of 
transactional interstate practice and apply the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Article 4 of the U.S. Constitution. 
I. Interstate Legal Practice in the United States 
A. Right of Nonresident Lawyers to Be Admitted to a State Bar:  
The Piper-Friedman-Barnard Trilogy 
 The U.S. Constitution does not contain an express statement set-
ting forth the freedom to provide interstate professional services.14 
“Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Martha Neil, Getting the Lowdown on GATS, 2 No. 26 A.B.A. J. E-Rep. 2 (2003). 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See generally Goebel, supra note 4, at 345. 
14 See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979). 
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lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Co-
lumbia within their respective jurisdictions.”15 Qualiªcations for admis-
sion to practice and the standards of professional conduct are estab-
lished by the states.16 Consequently, the general rule of unauthorized 
practice of law is that only lawyers who have passed the bar in one state 
are authorized to practice law in that state.17
 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
states that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United 
States.”18 This passage, referred to as the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, “was designed to ensure to a citizen of State A who ventures 
into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.”19 
When analyzing a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
the courts adopt a two-step process.20 First, the court establishes 
whether the activity in question is “sufªciently basic to the livelihood 
of the nation” so as to fall within the scope of the protection of the 
Clause.21 Second, the court invalidates the discriminating conduct 
only if it concludes that the restriction is not closely related to the ad-
vancement of a substantial state interest.22
 The ªrst case involving the application of the Privileges and Im-
munities analysis to interstate legal services was the landmark decision 
New Hampshire v. Piper.23 In that case, a Vermont resident brought an 
action against the New Hampshire Supreme Court challenging the 
residency requirement for admission to the bar.24 The Court struck 
down the residency requirement as violative of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause.25 The Court reached its conclusion by applying a two-
part analysis and reasoning that (i) the practice of law is important to 
the national economy and should be considered a fundamental right 
for the purposes of the Clause, and (ii) the residency requirement was 
not closely related to the advancement of a substantial state interest.26
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See Davis, supra note 2, at 1344. 
18 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
19 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64, quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). 
20 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64. 
21 See id. at 64–65. 
22 See id. at 65. 
23 See Piper, 470 U.S. at 275. 
24 See id. at 275–77. 
25 See id. at 288. 
26 See id. at 281, 285. 
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 The Court rejected the arguments that a nonresident lawyer 
would be less familiar with local rules or more prone to act unethi-
cally, and concluded that no substantial reason for the difference in 
treatment existed in this case.27
 In Virginia v. Friedman, the court once again dealt with the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause in the context of interstate legal ser-
vices.28 The issue before the Court involved the constitutionality of 
Virginia’s residency requirement imposed on out of state lawyers seek-
ing admission to the Virginia bar on motion without sitting for the 
local bar exam.29 The Court struck down the residency requirement 
conªrming the holding of Piper that “the practice of law . . . is 
sufªciently basic to the national economy to be deemed a privilege 
protected by the Clause.”30
 Once again, under the second prong of the test, the Court failed 
to ªnd a substantial state interest justifying discrimination against 
nonresident lawyers.31 In fact, the Court rejected the contentions that 
(i) only attorneys not admitted on motion would have a commitment 
to service and familiarity with Virginia law, and (ii) residency re-
quirements facilitate enforcement of the full-time requirement of the 
regulation at stake.32
 Finally, in Barnard v. Thorstenn, the Court held that the Federal 
District Court for the Virgin Islands could not impose a one-year resi-
dence requirement before admission to its bar.33 The Court con-
ªrmed that the practice of law is a privilege protected by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause and the residency requirement was not 
substantially related to the state’s interest in assuring that counsel 
would be available for appearances on short notice and would main-
tain an adequate level of professional competence.34
B. Temporary Interstate Transactional Practice in the United States 
 The Piper-Friedman-Barnard trilogy of cases conªrms that lawyers 
engaged in interstate practice may claim the protection of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause when seeking admission to a particular 
                                                                                                                      
27 See id. at 285–86. 
28 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 61. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 66. 
31 See id. at 68. 
32 See id. at 67–68 
33 See Barnard, 489 U.S. at 549, 558–59. 
34 See id. at 553, 557–58. 
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state bar.35 However, the Supreme Court has not expressed an opin-
ion on whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause affords protec-
tions to lawyers engaging in temporary interstate transactional prac-
tice.36
 Global business needs and technological innovations facilitate a 
law ªrm’s ability to offer legal services to distant clients as efªciently 
as clients in the same community.37
 Under the current system, the participation of a corporate lawyer 
in closing activities taking place out of state may lead to sanctions by 
local courts for unauthorized practice of law.38 Imagine the following 
scenario: a client running a corporate business in Florida asks a New 
York business lawyer to come to Florida and advise him in issuing secu-
rities to some targeted clients residing in Florida. The client requests 
the advice of that particular lawyer because he is a specialist in this area 
of law. This type of transactional legal advice is commonly tolerated; 
nevertheless, it falls into an area of uncertainty from a doctrinal point 
of view.39
 Case law shows that if the New York lawyer decides to advise his 
Florida client from his New York ofªce by means of e-mail, phone, or 
fax, he may dodge disciplinary sanctions, yet not with absolute cer-
tainty.40
 Should, however, the New York lawyer decide to embark on a 
business trip to Florida in order to be present at some negotiation 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 558–59; Friedman, 487 U.S. at 70; Piper, 470 U.S. at 288. 
36 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 322. 
37See Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unau-
thorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 665, 669 (1995). 
38 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 327. 
39 See id. 
40 See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5–6 
(Cal. 1998) (holding that a New York law ªrm, which previously drafted for a California 
client a contract governed by California law, by offering legal services in connection with 
the drafted agreement, committed unauthorized practice of law and was barred from re-
covering legal fees). The California Supreme Court noted that, although very fact sensi-
tive, advising a distant client through modern technological means can still trigger unau-
thorized practice of law. See id. at 5–6. Cf. Fought & Company Inc. v. Steel Engineering and 
Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487, 491-92. (Haw. 1998) (authorizing the payment of legal fees to 
an Oregon law ªrm engaged in the representation of a Hawaii client involved in litigation 
against the State of Hawaii). Even though the Oregon ªrm did not ªle for pro hac vice ap-
pearance and merely supervised the litigation, the Hawaii Supreme Court failed to adopt 
the Birbrower approach, stressing that the economy is transforming from local to global in 
nature. See Fought & Company, 951 P.2d at 497. 
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proceedings on behalf of his client, case law shows that he may incur 
sanctions for unauthorized practice of law.41
 In summary, the ability of a lawyer to advise a client, even upon 
request, when physically present in a state where he is not licensed to 
practice, presents very serious concerns due to sanctions for unau-
thorized practice of law.42
II. Temporary Interstate Transactional Practice in Europe 
 In the EU, lawyers are free to offer interstate transactional legal 
services with few limitations.43 The free movement of goods, persons, 
services, and capital is a cornerstone of the 1957 EC Treaty.44
 Article 49 of the EC Treaty provides for the abolition of restric-
tions on freedom to provide services within the Community whenever 
the provider of the service is established in a Member State different 
from the state of the recipient of the service.45 Article 50 states that 
persons providing services cannot be subject to discrimination on the 
basis of their nationality whenever the service provider is temporarily 
pursuing activities in a host state.46
 The landmark case, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur, discussed whether a 
Dutch lawyer authorized to handle administrative matters before 
Dutch tribunals could continue to do so after moving to Belgium.47 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that a California lawyer 
who spent a couple weeks in New York advising a New York resident in connection with a 
Connecticut divorce proceeding resulted in unauthorized practice of law). The court rea-
soned that the relevant section of the New York criminal statute and its policy is aimed “to 
protect our citizens against the dangers of legal representation and advice given by persons 
not trained, examined and licensed for such work, whether they be laymen or lawyers from 
other jurisdictions.” Id.; see also Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 162, 166 (N.D. 1986) 
(holding that a Minnesota tax lawyer who traveled several times to North Dakota to pro-
vide legal services to a client could not recover compensation for the services rendered in 
that state). The court in Ranta noted that the concept of legal practice included an attor-
ney’s rendering of tax advice and negotiating the sale of a client’s business. See Ranta, 391 
N.W.2d at 163. 
42 See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5–6; Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331; Ranta, 391 N.W.2d at 166. 
43 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 339. 
44 See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 3. 
45 EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 49. In order to render Community law effective, the 
doctrine of direct legal effect of the EC Treaty was developed by the European Court of 
Justice. See Goebel, supra note 4, at 310 n.22. The doctrine states that some treaty articles 
are sufªciently precise in their articulation of rights that may be given immediate effect by 
member state courts. See id. 
46 EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 50. 
47 Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van De Bedrijfsvereniging Voor De Metaalni-
jverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 299 (1975); Goebel, supra note 4, at 310. 
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The Dutch authorities claimed that residency was a requirement for 
the lawyer to continue his practice.48 The question before the ECJ was 
whether Articles 49 and 50 could have a direct legal effect in a na-
tional court proceeding providing immediate rights to the individu-
als.49 The ECJ concluded that Articles 49 and 50 do have direct legal 
effect in a way that nationals of Member States can rely upon them to 
perform professional services in any other Member State.50 The ECJ 
also established the principle that no Member State may discriminate 
against nationals of another state or apply its own nondiscriminatory 
rules regulating a profession unless the rules are justiªed by the gen-
eral common good.51 In the case at bar, no “general good” was found 
in barring the Dutch lawyer from practicing before the Dutch tribu-
nals while residing in Belgium, although Dutch professional responsi-
bility regulations might govern the nonresident lawyer’s practice.52
 The value of this precedent is great in that it not only prevents 
discrimination based on nationality, but also bars the application of 
state rules unless they are objectively justiªed by the general inter-
est.53
 The Van Binsbergen decision had a major impact on the Council 
Directive on lawyers’ freedom to provide services.54 The Council Direc-
tive is the legal cornerstone for the rights of lawyers to provide inter-
state services on a temporary basis throughout the Member States.55 It 
is noteworthy that Article 5 of the Council Directive sets forth a limit on 
cross border practice involving legal proceedings (presumably civil and 
criminal litigation before courts).56 In litigation activities, the state in 
which the lawyer desires to practice may require him to work in con-
junction with a lawyer member of the local bar.57 However, by implica-
tion from Article 5, if a lawyer engages in transactional practice, he 
does not have to be associated with a local attorney.58
                                                                                                                      
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 306 (1975). 
53 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 311. Council Directive 77/249, art.5., 1977 O.J. (L 77) 36 
[hereinafter Council Directive]. 
54 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 311; Council Directive 77/249, 1997 O.J. (L 78) 17. 
55 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 311. 
56 See Council Directive,supra note 53, art.5. 
57 See id. 
58 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 313. 
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 The most important recent judgment applying the Council Di-
rective is Gebhard v. Milan Bar Council.59 The ECJ indicated the proper 
guidelines to determine whether a lawyer is providing services on a 
temporary basis or is becoming established in a particular Member 
State.60 In that case, a German lawyer licensed to practice in Germany, 
moved his residence to Milan, opened his own ofªce, and started rep-
resenting German and Austrian clients in Italy with the aid of Italian 
lawyers.61 He also used the title “avvocato” on the letterhead of docu-
ments used for professional purposes and he appeared using the same 
title before the courts of Milan.62
 The ECJ held that the temporary nature of the provision of ser-
vices at stake is to be determined in light of its duration, regularity, 
periodicity, and continuity.63 Also, the court stressed that the provider 
of services may equip himself in the state where he seeks to exercise, 
with the infrastructures necessary for the purposes of performing the 
services in question.64
 Although Gebhard’s practice ultimately was not found to be 
within the category of temporary interstate service provider, the ECJ 
offered an extensive interpretation of the rights to provide temporary 
interstate legal services as previously set forth in the Council Direc-
tive.65 Any lawyer or law ªrm from any Member State of the EU has a 
right to provide occasional, but not continuous, transactional legal 
service throughout any Member State of the EU as long as it is offered 
on a speciªc project.66
III. Application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause  
to Temporary Interstate Transactional Practice  
in the United States 
 In this section, I suggest that courts might use the two-part analysis 
employed by the Supreme Court in Piper, Friedman, and Barnard to reach 
                                                                                                                      
59 Case C-55194, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Milano, 1995 
E.C.R. I-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1996). 
60 See Malcolm Jarvis, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services—Lawyers on 
the Move, 21 Eur. L. Rev. 247, 247–252 (1996). 
61 Case C-55194, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-4165. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See Jarvis, supra note 60, at 247–252. 
66 Goebel, supra note 4, at 317. 
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the conclusion that limiting temporary interstate transactional practice 
would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 4.67
 Under the test, courts must ªrst determine whether the activity in 
question is sufªciently basic to the livelihood of the Nation so as to fall 
within the scope of the protection of the Clause.68 The Supreme Court 
held in Piper, and later conªrmed in Friedman and Barnard, that the 
right to practice law is protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.69 Interstate transactional practice is an aspect of practicing law, 
and therefore is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.70
 Under the second part of the test, the issue is whether “(i) there 
is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the dis-
crimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial rela-
tionship to the State’s objective.”71
 In order to assess the presence of a substantial reason for the dif-
ference in treatment, it is important to look at the policies that stand 
behind the line of cases limiting interstate transactional practice.72
 These decisions, addressing interstate legal practice, emphasize 
the tension between the protection of economic efªciency on one 
side, and assurance of an ethical standard and representation from 
trained lawyers, on the other.73
 It is clear that promoting a liberalization of the legal restriction to 
practice in an interstate context would cater to those business clients 
“which can utilize their customary counsel throughout their market, 
whenever the lawyers are deemed by the client to be competent.”74 
Courts, however, seem to be more concerned about protecting the 
same clients against “the dangers of legal representation and advice 
given by persons not trained, examined and licensed for such work.”75 
Courts, arguably, seem to agree on the underlying assumption that an 
out of state lawyer might end up harming the client’s interests because 
of lack of training or competence with the local substantive laws.76
 Nevertheless, the Court has previously addressed these concerns 
in Piper, and later in Barnard, by holding that there is no evidence to 
                                                                                                                      
67See Barnard, 489 U.S. at 552–53; Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64–66; Piper, 470 U.S. at 283–84. 
68 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64–65; Piper, 470 U.S. at 279. 
69 See Piper, 470 U.S. at 281; Barnard, 489 U.S. at 553; Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65. 
70 See Piper, 470 U.S. at 281. 
71 Piper, 470 U.S. at 284. 
72 See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 8; Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331. 
73 See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 6; Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331. 
74 Goebel, supra note 4, at 340. 
75 Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331. 
76 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 342. 
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show that nonresidents might be less likely to keep abreast of local 
rules and procedures or practice law in a dishonest manner.77 There 
are no reasons why such a rationale could not be applied to tempo-
rary interstate transactional practice as well.78
 Furthermore, the discrimination practiced against nonresidents 
does not bear a substantial relationship to the state’s objective of as-
suring competent and honest representation to residents.79 In fact, 
states have other, less restrictive means available than declaring inter-
state transactional practice illegal.80 For example, a state may subject a 
practicing attorney, who seeks to advise clients inbound, to mandatory 
periodic legal education courses and apply to him the same ethical 
standards that already govern locally practicing attorneys.81
 In one case, a district court actually attempted to apply the Privi-
leges and Immunities protection to the context of interstate transac-
tional practice.82 The court in Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp. reasoned 
that protection of the right of a client to obtain services of the lawyer 
of his choice should be protected.83 The holding, however, was lim-
ited to the assistance of an out of state lawyer working in association 
with a local lawyer on a federal claim or defense.84
Conclusion 
 In summary, the liberal approach adopted by the EU, with re-
spect to temporary interstate transactional practice, appears to be 
more in consonance with modern commercial needs than the ap-
proach currently existing in the United States.85
 Maybe it is time for the U.S. courts to adopt a more liberal ap-
proach, with respect to cross-border transactional practice, through 
an application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause doctrine. The 
practice of law is a privilege under Article 4 jurisprudence86 and a few 
considerations seem decisive in undercutting states’ reasons for dif-
ferent treatment with respect to out of state transactional lawyers: (i) 
                                                                                                                      
77 See Barnard, 489 U.S. at 555; Piper, 470 U.S. at 285. 
78 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 341. 
79 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 68. 
80 See Piper, 470 U.S. at 285 n.19. 
81 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 69. 
82 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1964). 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 171. 
85 See Davis, supra note 2, at 1341. 
86 See Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66. 
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citizens have a right to secure the legal services that they prefer;87 (ii) 
competent and ethical out of state lawyers are not to be presumed to 
fail to familiarize themselves with local substantive law where neces-
sary;88 and (iii) states’ barriers to interstate transactional practice cre-
ate higher costs of representation for clients and represent economic 
protectionism of the local bar.89
 States have other less restrictive means available to achieve cli-
ents’ protection against unqualiªed and unprofessional conduct such 
as subjecting the out of state lawyer to local ethical rules.90 The EU 
approach indicates that the risks of disserving clients are minimal, 
and the undeniable advantages would accommodate modern clients’ 
increasingly diverse commercial needs.91
                                                                                                                      
87 See Spanos, 364 F.2d at 170. 
88 See Barnard, 489 U.S. at 555. 
89 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 344. 
90 See Piper, 470 U.S. at 284. 
91 See Goebel, supra note 4, at 344-45. 
